The reform of the investor–State dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism has sparked intense debate among commentators. The proliferation of ISDS cases means that the mechanism can exert increasing influence on international and domestic laws, which creates higher expectations (and thus more critiques) of the independence, fairness, coherence and transparency of arbitral decision making.2² For States, however, there seems to exist competing motivations for reform: on one hand, they seem to envisage that certain measures to judicialize ISDS are desirable (for example, establishing appellate tribunals and increasing transparency and public participation in ISDS proceedings); on the other hand, meanwhile, States are seeking to reinforce their control over treaty interpretation—a core part of judicial law making—through subsequent agreements and subsequent practice. This phenomenon is particularly embodied in two proposed (or adopted) institutional arrangements: the binding interpretative notes of treaty committees and the prioritized treatment of non-disputing treaty parties’ amicus curiae submissions on issues of treaty interpretation. The former arrangement obligates investment tribunals to follow the interpretative opinions issued by treaty parties (even if they are issued after the dispute arises),3³ and the latter, as will be detailed below, obligates tribunals to consider non-disputing treaty parties’ opinions on treaty interpretation. These measures may give rise to serious legitimacy problems and create a potential conflict between rule by judges as against rule by States. The dilemma that States are faced with in choosing between judicialization and politicization should not be surprising: they are both the legislator and the respondent parties in ISDS, which gives rise to competing demands for a rule-based system vis-à-vis ample space for political control.4⁴

中文翻译：

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法庭之友参加ISDS的法庭之友：对条约解释中的政治干预保持谨慎

投资者与国家间争端解决机制的改革引发了评论员之间的激烈辩论。ISDS案件的激增意味着该机制可以对国际和国内法施加越来越大的影响，从而对仲裁决策的独立性，公正性，连贯性和透明度产生更高的期望（从而引起更多的批评）。2 ²但是，对于国家而言，似乎存在着相互竞争的改革动机：一方面，它们似乎设想采取某些措施将ISDS司法化是可取的（例如，设立上诉法庭，提高透明度和公众参与ISDS程序）；另一方面，另一方面，各国正在寻求通过随后的协议和随后的实践，加强对条约解释的控制，这是司法立法制定的核心部分。这种现象尤其体现在两个拟议的（或已通过的）体制安排中：条约委员会具有约束力的解释性说明和对无争议条约缔约方的法庭之友的优先处理关于条约解释问题的意见书。前一种安排使投资法庭有义务遵守条约当事方发表的解释性意见（即使它们是在争端发生后发表的），3 ³，而下文将详述的后者则使法庭有义务考虑无争议的条约当事方的意见。关于条约的解释。这些措施可能引起严重的合法性问题，并在法官的统治与国家的统治之间造成潜在的冲突。各国在司法化和政治化之间做出选择时所面临的困境不应该令人惊讶：它们既是ISDS的立法者又是被诉方，这引起了对基于规则的系统相对于足够的空间进行竞争的需求。政治控制4⁴