We present an experiment where subjects sequentially receive signals about the true state of the world and need to form beliefs about which one is true, with payoffs related to reported beliefs. We attempt to control for risk aversion using the Offerman et al. (Rev Econ Stud 76(4):1461–1489, 2009) technique. Against the baseline of Bayesian updating, we test for belief adjustment underreaction and overreaction and model the decision making process of the agent as a double hurdle model where agents with inferential expectations first decide whether to adjust their beliefs and then, if so, decide by how much. We also test the effects of increased inattention and complexity on belief updating. We find evidence for periods of belief inertia interspersed with belief adjustment. This is due to a combination of random belief adjustment; state-dependent belief adjustment, with many subjects requiring considerable evidence to change their beliefs; and quasi-Bayesian belief adjustment, with aggregate insufficient belief adjustment when a belief change does occur. Inattention, like complexity, makes subjects less likely to adjust their stated beliefs, while inattention additionally discourages full adjustment.

我们提出了一个实验，受测者依次接收有关世界真实状态的信号，并需要形成关于哪一个是真实的信念，其回报与所报告的信念有关。我们尝试使用Offerman等人的方法来控制风险规避。（Rev Econ Stud 76（4）：1461-1489，2009）技术。以贝叶斯更新为基准，我们测试信念调整反应不足和反应过度，并将代理的决策过程建模为双重障碍模型，其中具有推论性期望的代理首先决定是否调整其信念，然后（如果这样）决定如何很多。我们还测试了注意力不集中和复杂性增加对信念更新的影响。我们发现在信念惯性与信念调整之间穿插的证据。这是由于随机信念调整的结合；与国家有关的信念调整，许多受试者需要大量证据才能改变其信念；和准贝叶斯信念调整，当信念发生变化时，总体上信念调整不足。与复杂性一样，注意力不集中会使主体不太可能调整其陈述的信念，而注意力不集中还会阻碍全面调整。