ABSTRACT

Inspired by an idea that occurred to me during a walking holiday in Scotland, this article identifies a new dimension to place memory: namely, the way in which we can be unexpectedly reminded of one place in another that is, on first inspection, very different. Reflecting on this phenomenon has led me to propose (similar to Hayden Lorimer) that topographical features such as slope, camber and terrain are key to embodied memories and help explain why they are, on occasion, transportable. This thesis then becomes the springboard for a dialogue with the post-phenomenological approaches to landscape developed by John Wylie and others regarding the existential (im) possibility of there being any ‘coincidence’ between ‘self and world’. My counter-argument proceeds via an exploration of different models of memory – in particular, Henri Bergson’s work on déjà-vu – which helps explain our fleeting sensations of familiarity and belonging to particular locations. By this means, the notional indifference of the landscape (as construed by the post-phenomenologists) is emplaced. These conclusions return the discussion to wider debates in cultural geography about what we stand to lose, and exclude, through the move from phenomenological to post-phenomenological frameworks.

摘要

受我在苏格兰徒步旅行时想到的一个想法的启发，这篇文章确定了一个新的维度来放置记忆：即，我们可以在另一个地方意外地想起一个地方的方式，在第一次检查时，这是非常不同的. 对这种现象的反思让我提出（类似于海登洛里默）坡度、弧度和地形等地形特征是具身记忆的关键，并有助于解释为什么它们有时是可移动的。然后，这篇论文成为与约翰·怀利和其他人就“自我与世界”之间存在任何“巧合”的存在 (im) 可能性开发的景观后现象学方法进行对话的跳板。我的反驳是通过探索不同的记忆模型来进行的——尤其是亨利·柏格森 (Henri Bergson) 关于似曾相识——这有助于解释我们对特定地点的熟悉感和归属感。通过这种方式，风景的概念性冷漠（如后现象学家所解释的那样）被安置了。通过从现象学框架到后现象学框架的转变，这些结论将讨论带回到文化地理学中更广泛的辩论中，即我们将失去和排除什么。