We study family firm status as an important condition in signaling theory; specifically, we propose that the market reacts more positively to positive, and more negatively to negative, CSR news (i.e., signals) from family firms than to similar news from nonfamily firms. Moreover, we propose that during recessions, the direction of these relationships reverses. Based on an event study of 1247 positive and negative changes in the CSR ratings for all firms listed on the French SFB120 stock market index (2003-2013), we find support for our hypotheses. Moreover, a post hoc analysis reveals that the relationships are contingent on whether a family CEO leads the firm.

我们研究家族企业地位是信号理论中的重要条件。具体来说，我们建议市场对家族企业的CSR新闻（即信号）的反应要比对非家族企业的类似新闻更积极，对消极的负面反应更大。此外，我们建议在经济衰退期间，这些关系的方向会相反。基于对法国SFB120股票市场指数（2003-2013年）上所有上市公司的CSR评级出现1247个正负变化的事件研究，我们发现了我们的假设支持。此外，事后分析表明，这种关系取决于家族首席执行官是否领导该公司。