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Joint pricing and replenishment policies for risk-averse retailers under duopolistic competition
Managerial and Decision Economics ( IF 2.5 ) Pub Date : 2021-04-27 , DOI: 10.1002/mde.3350
Zhen Zhang 1, 2 , Songtao Zhang 3 , Mingshi Yue 4
Affiliation  

This study investigates the coordination of pricing and inventory replenishment under retail competition. Although conventional wisdom suggests that a retailer follow conservative operating strategies when the competing retailer adopts a markdown strategy, the retailer may actually raise its price (order) if its operational costs are sufficiently high (low) and its competitor's price is relatively low. If the retailer is more risk averse, its pricing and replenishment decisions hinge highly on its risk aversion level and its competitor's current price. The increase of the wholesale price always hurts the retailers and may even hurt the manufacturer if it is exorbitant.

中文翻译:

双头垄断竞争下规避风险零售商的联合定价和补货政策

本研究调查零售竞争下定价和库存补货的协调。尽管传统观点认为,当竞争零售商采用降价策略时,零售商会遵循保守的经营策略,但如果其运营成本足够高(低)且竞争对手的价格相对较低,则该零售商实际上可能会提高其价格(订单)。如果零售商更厌恶风险,其定价和补货决策在很大程度上取决于其风险规避水平和竞争对手的当前价格。批发价格的上涨总是伤害零售商,如果过高甚至可能伤害制造商。
更新日期:2021-04-27
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