An important strand in philosophy of science takes scientific explanation to consist in the conveyance of some kind of information (e.g., Lewis, 1986; Railton, Synthese, 48, 233–56, 1981). Here I argue that this idea is also implicit in some core arguments of mechanists, some of whom (e.g., Craver, 2014) are proponents of an ontic conception of explanation that might be thought inconsistent with it (Piccinini & Craver, Synthese, 183, 283–311, 2011; Zednik, 2015). However, informational accounts seem to conflict with some lay and scientific commonsense judgments and a central goal of the theory of explanation, because information is relative to the background knowledge of agents (Dretske, 1981). Sometimes we make lay judgments about whether a model is an explanation simpliciter, not just an explanation relative to some particular agent. And as philosophers of explanation, we would like a philosophical account to tell us when a model is an explanation simpliciter, not just when a model is an explanation relative to some particular agent. Thus, even if one’s account of explanation is not concerned with explanation qua communicative or speech act, the account’s reliance on the concept of information generates a prima facie conflict between the claims that 1) explanation is the conveyance of information, 2) information is relative to the background knowledge of an agent, and 3) some models are explanations not relative to the background knowledge of any particular agent. I sketch a solution to this puzzle by distinguishing informationally what I call “explanation simpliciter” from what I call “explanation-to,” relativizing the latter to an individual’s background knowledge and the former to what I call “total scientific background knowledge”.

科学哲学的一个重要方面是采用科学解释来传达某种信息（例如，Lewis，1986； Railton，Synthese，48：233-56，1981）。在这里，我认为，这一观点在机械师的一些核心论点中也是隐含的，其中一些论者（例如Craver，2014年）是本体论解释概念的拥护者，这些论点可能被认为与之不符（Piccinini＆Craver，Synthese，183，2011年，283-311；Zednik，2015年）。但是，信息说明似乎与某些外行和科学常识性的判断以及解释理论的中心目标相抵触，因为信息是与代理人的背景知识有关的（Dretske，1981）。有时我们会做出关于模型是否是解释简化器的判断，而不仅仅是相对于某些特定主体的解释。作为解释的哲学家，我们希望通过哲学的解释告诉我们模型何时是简化的解释者，而不仅仅是模型是相对于某些特定主体的解释。因此，即使一个人的解释说明与交际或言语行为的解释无关，该说明对信息概念的依赖也会产生这些主张之间存在表面上的矛盾，即：1）解释是信息的传递； 2）信息是与代理的背景知识有关的； 3）一些模型是与任何特定代理的背景知识无关的解释。我通过在信息上区分我所谓的“解释简化程序”与我所说的“解释为”，将后者与个人的背景知识相对应，而使前者与我所谓的“全部科学背景知识”相对应，来为这个难题提供解决方案。