Stochastically arriving objects (e.g. transplant organs, public housing units) often are allocated via waiting lists exhibiting deferral rights: agents may decline offers, keeping their position in line. We consider the welfare implications of bestowing or constraining such rights, concluding that their desirability depends—in opposite ways—on agents' risk-aversion and impatience. Under risk-aversion, uninfluenced deferral rights typically enhance welfare. Under discounting some restrictions on deferral rights can benefit all agents joining the list. In a stylized “organ spoilage” model our results demonstrate that policy evaluations should not be based solely on throughput metrics (e.g. organ utilization rates) that ignore such preference characteristics.

随机到达的物品（例如移植器官，公共住房单位）通常是通过展示延期权利的候补名单来分配的：代理商可能会拒绝要约，从而保持立场一致。我们考虑授予或限制此类权利对福利的影响，认为它们的可取性（以相反的方式）取决于代理人的风险规避和不耐烦。在规避风险的情况下，不受影响的递延权利通常会提高福利。通过打折，对延期权利的一些限制可以使所有加入该列表的代理人受益。在程式化的“器官腐败”模型中，我们的结果表明，政策评估不应仅基于忽略此类偏好特征的吞吐量指标（例如，器官利用率）。