In the explanations of logical laws and inference rules of the mature version of Begriffsschrift in Grundgesetze, Frege uses the predicate “… is the True.” Scholars like Greimann maintain that this predicate is a metalinguistic truth-predicate for Frege. This paper examines an argument for this claim that is based on the “nominal reading” of Frege’s conception of sentences—the claim that for Frege a sentence “$ p $” is equivalent to a nonsentential phrase like “the truth-value of the thought that $ p $.” In particular, this paper attempts to establish two points concerning this argument based on the nominal reading. First, the argument implies a claim about the nature of assertion which Frege repeatedly denies in his mature works. Secondly, the nominal reading on which the argument depends is false. A sentence “$ p $” is not equivalent to a nonsentential phrase like “the truth-value of the thought that $ p $” for Frege. Our discussion will lead to an important lesson about Frege’s conception of sentences and of assertion.

中文翻译：

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弗雷格在 Begriffsschrift 中有元语言真谓词吗？

在对成熟版的逻辑规律和推理规则的解释中初稿在Grundgesetze，弗雷格使用谓词“……是真实的”。Greimann 等学者坚持认为，这个谓词是弗雷格的元语言真谓词。本文检验了这一主张的论证，该论证基于对弗雷格句子概念的“名义阅读”——弗雷格的句子“$ p $”等价于非句子短语，例如“思想的真值$ p $。” 特别是，本文试图在名义阅读的基础上建立关于这一论点的两点。首先，这个论点暗示了一种关于断言性质的主张，弗雷格在他的成熟作品中一再否认。其次，论证所依赖的名义阅读是错误的。一句话 ”$ p $”不等价于像“思想的真值”这样的非句子短语$ p $”对于弗雷格。我们的讨论将引出关于弗雷格的句子和断言概念的重要一课。