Acquisitions are competitive moves that disrupt an industry’s competitive structure. As a result, firms are often not passive observers of their rival’s acquisitions, but actively retaliate against such competitive moves. In this study, we explore these dynamics by analyzing one way in which multimarket contact may influence acquisition strategies, namely, the type of targets acquired. We contribute to the acquisition literature by clarifying the role that pre-acquisition competitive interdependencies play in firms’ acquisition strategies. Specifically, we suggest that high multimarket contact firms do not necessarily avoid acquisition activity. Instead, these firms are more likely to acquire targets that are less likely to incur retaliation from interconnected rivals. We also explore two important boundary conditions to this relationship: (1) the market’s competitive structure and (2) the location of the target firm. Our empirical tests of a sample of 741 bank holding companies from 1995 to 2014 offer support for our hypotheses.

收购是破坏行业竞争结构的竞争举措。结果，企业通常不是对竞争对手收购行为的被动观察者，而是积极对这种竞争行为进行报复。在这项研究中，我们通过分析多市场联系可能影响收购策略（即所收购目标的类型）的一种方式来探索这些动力。我们澄清的作用是有助于获得文学预收购竞争的相互依赖关系在企业的收购策略中发挥作用。具体而言，我们建议高级的多市场联系公司不一定避免收购活动。相反，这些公司更有可能获得目标，而这些目标不太可能招致相互关联的竞争对手的报复。我们还探讨了这种关系的两个重要边界条件：（1）市场的竞争结构和（2）目标公司的位置。我们对1995年至2014年间741家银行控股公司的样本进行的实证检验为我们的假设提供了支持。