We examine how options trading affects voluntary corporate disclosure, so that we can shed light on whether managers’ potential learning from the options market induces them to withhold disclosure. We find that options trading reduces the likelihood and frequency of management earnings forecasts, suggesting that firms that have active options trading on their stock make fewer voluntary disclosures. This finding is in accordance with the theoretical prediction that managers strategically reduce disclosure to avoid crowding out informed trading, which can give them informative feedback for their decision making. In support of the managerial learning channel, we document a real effect of reduced disclosure: When managers disclose less, options trading has a stronger positive effect on firm investment efficiency. The more pronounced effect of options trading on management earnings forecasts when the need for managerial learning is higher further supports the learning channel.

中文翻译：

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少说多学：应对期权市场管理学习的战略披露

我们研究了期权交易如何影响自愿性公司披露，以便我们可以阐明经理从期权市场中的潜在学习是否会诱使他们隐瞒披露。我们发现期权交易降低了管理层盈利预测的可能性和频率，这表明对其股票进行积极期权交易的公司做出的自愿披露较少。这一发现与理论预测一致，即管理者战略性地减少披露以避免排挤知情交易，这可以为他们的决策提供信息反馈。为了支持管理学习渠道，我们记录了减少披露的实际影响：当经理披露较少时，期权交易对公司投资效率具有更强的积极影响。