Individuals with conditions like borderline personality disorder (BPD) experience chronic, pervasive impairments that interfere with moral functioning. Even in recovery these individuals are plagued by residual symptoms, requiring diligence and management. First, I stipulate that some individuals who recover from BPD (and similar conditions) act morally. I argue that by acting morally while managing residual symptoms these individuals expand the boundaries of traditional Aristotelian virtue. Individuals who recover from BPD are simultaneously virtuous and outside the boundaries of traditional Aristotelian virtue if they meet the following conditions: (1) they experience marked, unchangeable morally-relevant difference(s) in moral faculties; (2) act morally at approximately the same rate or better than other moral agents; and (3) act morally for the right reasons. These individuals challenge the boundaries of traditional Aristotelian virtue by demonstrating that many views of temperance and virtue are too restrictive. I evaluate multiple interpretations of McDowell’s [1] silencing view and call for a more inclusive virtue ethics that embraces continence in the vein of Foot’s [2] corrective view.

患有边缘性人格障碍（BPD）等疾病的人会遭受慢性，普遍性的障碍，从而影响道德功能。即使在康复中，这些人也受到残留症状的困扰，需要勤勉和管理。首先，我规定一些从BPD（和类似状况）中恢复过来的人在道德上行事。我认为，通过在保持残余症状的同时采取道德行事，这些人扩大了传统亚里士多德美德的范围。从BPD中恢复过来的个人，如果满足以下条件，则同时具有道德和超越传统亚里斯多德主义的美德：（1）他们在道德能力上遇到明显的，不可改变的与道德相关的差异；（2）在道德上以与其他道德主体大致相同的速度或更好的方式行事；（3）出于正确的理由在道德上行事。这些人通过证明许多节制和美德的观点过于严格来挑战传统的亚里士多德美德的界限。我评估了麦克道尔[1]沉默观的多种解释，并呼吁建立一种更具包容性的美德伦理学，以道德的脚步[2]进行矫正。