This paper argues that a class of popular views of collective intention, which I call “quasi-psychologism”, faces a problem explaining common intuitions about collective action. Views in this class hold that collective intentions are realized in or constituted by individual, mental, participatory intentions. I argue that this metaphysical commitment entails persistence conditions that are in tension with a purported obligation to notify co-actors before leaving a collective action attested to by participants in experimental research about the interpersonal normativity of collective action. I then explore the possibilities open to quasi-psychologists for responding to this research.

本文认为，我称之为“准心理主义”的一类流行的集体意图观点面临着解释关于集体行动的普遍直觉的问题。这一类的观点认为，集体意图是在个体的、心理的、参与的意图中实现或构成的。我认为，这种形而上学的承诺需要持久性条件，这些条件与所谓的在离开集体行动之前通知合作者的义务处于紧张状态，参与者在关于集体行动的人际规范性的实验研究中证明了这一点。然后，我探索了准心理学家对这项研究做出回应的可能性。