We propose strike mechanisms as a solution to the classical problem of Hurwicz and Schmeidler (1978) and Maskin (1999) according to which, in two-person societies, no Pareto efficient rule is Nash-implementable. A strike mechanism specifies the number of alternatives that each player vetoes. Each player simultaneously casts these vetoes and the mechanism selects randomly one alternative among the non-vetoed ones. For strict preferences over alternatives and under a very weak condition for extending preferences over lotteries, these mechanisms are deterministic-in-equilibrium. They Nash implement a class of Pareto efficient social choice rules called Pareto-and-veto rules. Moreover, under mild richness conditions on the domain of preferences over lotteries, any Pareto efficient Nash-implementable rule is a Pareto-and-veto rule and hence is implementable through a strike mechanism.

我们提出了罢工机制，以解决Hurwicz和Schmeidler（1978）和Maskin（1999）的经典问题，根据该问题，在两人社会中，没有帕累托有效规则是纳什可实现的。罢工机制指定每个玩家否决的替代方案的数量。每个玩家同时投下这些否决权，并且该机制从非否决权中随机选择一个备选方案。对于严格的选择偏好和在扩展对彩票的偏好的非常弱的条件下，这些机制是确定性的。他们纳什执行了一类称为帕累托和否决的帕累托有效社会选择规则规则。而且，在优先于彩票领域的适度富裕条件下，任何帕累托有效的纳什可实施规则都是帕累托和否决规则，因此可通过罢工机制实施。