Virtualization technology is nowadays adopted in security-critical embedded systems to achieve higher performance and more design flexibility. However, it also comes with new security threats, where attackers leverage timing covert channels to exfiltrate sensitive information from a partition using a trojan. This paper presents a novel approach for the experimental assessment of timing covert channels in embedded hypervisors, with a case study on security assessment of a commercial hypervisor product (Wind River VxWorks MILS), in cooperation with a licensed laboratory for the Common Criteria security certification. Our experimental analysis shows that it is indeed possible to establish a timing covert channel, and that the approach is useful for system designers for assessing that their configuration is robust against this kind of information leakage.

如今，安全关键型嵌入式系统中采用了虚拟化技术，以实现更高的性能和更多的设计灵活性。但是，它也带来了新的安全威胁，攻击者利用定时秘密通道利用特洛伊木马从分区中窃取敏感信息。本文提供了一种新颖的方法，用于对嵌入式虚拟化管理程序中的定时隐蔽通道进行实验评估，并与通用标准的许可实验室合作，对商用虚拟化管理程序产品（Wind River VxWorks MILS）的安全性评估进行了案例研究。安全认证。我们的实验分析表明，确实有可能建立一个定时隐蔽通道，并且该方法对于系统设计人员评估其配置对这种信息泄漏的鲁棒性很有用。