abstract:

My aim in this paper is to clarify J. G. Fichte's theory of drives, its origins in the biology of the 1780s and 1790s, and its role in Fichte's moral psychology. I begin by outlining some components of Fichte's theory of agency and his theory of organism that seem puzzling if one assumes, as scholars typically do, that these discussions are indebted primarily to Kant. I then introduce J. F. Blumenbach's theory of natural self-organization, describe some differences between Blumenbach's actual view and Kant's presentation of it in the third Critique, and offer some textual evidence that Fichte was aware of these differences and was consciously following Blumenbach and departing from Kant in his conception of organic nature. I then explain how Fichte employs that conception of organism in his response to what had become by the early 1790s one of the central worries about Kantian moral philosophy: the worry about the harmony of rational and natural aspects of human character, articulated most influentially by Schiller.

摘要：

本文的目的是阐明JG Fichte的动力理论，其起源于1780和1790年代的生物学及其在Fichte道德心理学中的作用。首先，我概述了费希特的代理理论和他的有机体理论的某些组成部分，如果人们像学者们通常所认为的那样，认为这些讨论主要归功于康德，这似乎令人费解。然后，我介绍了布鲁门巴赫（JF Blumenbach）的自然自组织理论，描述了布鲁门巴赫（Blumenbach）的实际观点与康德（Kant）在第三次批评中的陈述之间的某些差异。，并提供一些文字证据，证明菲希特（Fichte）意识到了这些差异，并且有意识地跟随布鲁门巴赫（Blumenbach）并从康德的有机自然观出发。然后，我将解释费希特如何在回应1790年代初期对康德式道德哲学的主要担忧之一时运用这种有机体概念：对席勒最有影响力的人性理性和自然方面的和谐的担忧。