Reviewed by:

• Feelings of Believing: Psychology, History, Phenomenology by Ryan Hickerson
• Hayden Kee

There has been a slowly developing appreciation from various quarters in recent decades that the overlap between the philosophy of the emotions and epistemology might be greater than one would initially assume. Ryan Hickerson's Feelings of Believing: Psychology, History, and Phenomenology makes a timely and highly original contribution to this discussion. But its scope and appeal reach far beyond that somewhat niche issue, extending (as the subtitle promises) to psychology, history of philosophy, phenomenology, and beyond.

The book's central theses are that doxastic sentimentalism "plays a central role in the history of modern epistemology" (30), and that it ought to play a greater role in contemporary systematic work in epistemology. Doxastic sentiments are feelings related to beliefs, or "beliefy feelings" (1). Though there are various beliefy feelings, certainty and related feelings have been the most prominent and important in the history of epistemology. Hickerson admits various formulations of doxastic sentimentalism, varying from weak to strong (55), but the basic idea of doxastic sentimentalism is that "doxastic sentiments always accompany beliefs about what exists, or about what is the case" (2). Hickerson argues that doxastic sentimentalism has been an important strand in the history of modern philosophy, though one that has been largely neglected. It has gone unnoticed in part because certainty has been conceptualized by psychologists and philosophers alike in ways that obscure its sentimental character. Hickerson proposes to remedy this neglect by providing highlights of an alternative history of philosophy, critical overviews of the psychological research on certainty, and novel phenomenological analyses of the feeling of believing.

The book consists of a substantial introduction and conclusion bookending six chapters on history, psychology, and phenomenology. The four historical chapters on Hume, Descartes, Husserl, and James tease out the overt and covert strands of doxastic sentimentalism in each thinker. Interrogating these classic texts in this light leads to refreshing, highly original readings, even where Hickerson needs to hack through a thicket of secondary literature to return to the original sources. The chapter on Descartes breaks an interpretive stalemate and refines the classic Cartesian circle by interpreting "clarity and distinctness" as doxastic sentiments. The chapter on Husserl carefully disentangles the various notions of Evidenz in Husserl's corpus to arrive at a doxastic sentimentalist understanding of imperfect self-evidence, a finding that is as provocative on first glance as it is compelling after considering Hickerson's careful exegesis and argument. A chapter reviewing recent decades of psychological research on overconfidence highlights the need to distinguish between metacognitive judgments and metacognitive feelings, an insight as important for psychology as for philosophy. And a chapter on the phenomenology and psychology of beliefy feelings makes the case, critical for the book's overall argument, that doxastic sentiments can go unnoticed and hence may be more prevalent in our conscious experience than we are wont to acknowledge. The book concludes with a segue to virtue epistemology, arguing that attending to these usually unnoticed doxastic sentiments is epistemically virtuous.

Feelings of Believing is thoroughly researched and cogently argued. It spans a broad range of historical and contemporary issues from diverse perspectives, but with minimal sacrifice of depth on all fronts. Of course, any book that covers this much territory is bound to leave some gaps. One might have expected to find greater engagement with the burgeoning cognitive phenomenology literature. While the book stresses the distinction between beliefs and judgments, it does little to elucidate the process(es) of deliberation that lead from the former to the latter. And though the fruits of Hickerson's investigations themselves stand as a provisional proof of concept for the hybrid method of incorporating phenomenology, psychology, and history of philosophy, some specialists in each field will surely be irked by what will be perceived as external meddling from practitioners of the others.

But these are niggling points of critique in the face of the book's many merits. Substantively, Hickerson advances an original, highly controversial thesis, and by the [End Page 340] book's end doxastic sentimentalism stands...

审核人：

• 相信的感觉：心理学，历史，现象学，作者：瑞安·希克森（Ryan Hickerson）
• 海顿记

近几十年来，各个方面逐渐认识到，情感哲学和认识论之间的重叠可能大于最初的假设。瑞安·希克森（Ryan Hickerson）的“相信的感觉：心理学，历史学和现象学”对这一讨论做出了及时而高度原创的贡献。但是它的范围和吸引力远远超出了那个小众问题，延伸到了心理学，哲学史，现象学等领域（正如副标题所承诺的）。

该书的中心论点是，情感情感主义“在现代认识论的历史中起着中心作用”（30），并且它应该在当代认识论的系统性工作中发挥更大的作用。糊涂情绪是与信念相关的感觉，即“信仰感觉”（1）。尽管存在各种各样的信仰情感，但是确定性和相关情感一直是认识论历史上最突出和最重要的。希克森（Hickerson）接受了从弱到强的各种形式的情感情感主义（55），但是情感情感主义的基本思想是“情感情感总是伴随着对存在的信念或对情况的信念”（2）。希克森认为，尽管现代情感主义的历史已被广泛忽略，但苦涩的情感主义已成为现代哲学史上的重要一环。它在一定程度上没有引起人们的注意，因为确定性已经希克森建议通过提供另类哲学史的要点，对确定性的心理学研究的批判性概述以及对信念感觉的新颖现象学分析，来弥补这种疏忽，以弥补这种疏忽，以弥补这种疏忽。

本书由大量引言和结论组成，涉及历史，心理学和现象学六章。关于休ume，笛卡尔，胡塞尔和詹姆斯的四个历史性章节嘲笑了每位思想家的明显的和暗淡的多愁善感。从这种角度审问这些经典文本会带来令人耳目一新的原始读物，即使在希克森需要破解大量二手文献丛以返回原始出处的情况下也是如此。关于笛卡尔的章节打破了解释性的僵局，并通过将“明晰性和鲜明性”解释为近摄情感来完善了经典的笛卡尔圈。关于胡塞尔的这一章仔细地阐明了埃维登兹的各种概念在胡塞尔的语料库中，对不完美的证据进行了盲目的感性认识，这一发现乍一看就像在考虑了希克森的谨慎训ex和论点后一样具有说服力。回顾最近几十年来对过度自信的心理学研究的一章强调指出，有必要区分元认知判断和元认知感受，这对心理学和哲学同样重要。关于信仰感觉的现象学和心理学的一章使对本书的整体论点至关重要的情况是，人们可能不会注意到忧郁情绪，因此在我们的有意识经历中它可能比我们不愿承认的更为普遍。该书以对美德认识论的探讨为结尾，认为关注这些通常不为人所知的糊涂情感在认识论上是有道理的。

相信的感觉经过深入研究和有力论证。它从不同的角度涵盖了广泛的历史和当代问题，但在各个方面的深度牺牲都很少。当然，任何涵盖这么多领域的书都必定会留有一些空白。人们可能期望找到更多与新兴的认知现象学文献互动的机会。尽管该书强调了信念和判断之间的区别，但它对于阐明从前者引导到后者的审议过程几乎没有作用。尽管希克森的研究成果本身就是结合现象学，心理学和哲学史的混合方法的临时概念证明，

但是，鉴于本书的诸多优点，这些都是批评的ni点。实质上，希克森提出了一个原始的，备受争议的论文，而到[End Page 340]这本书的结尾，多愁善感代表了...