Reviewed by:

• Heidegger Becoming Phenomenological: Interpreting Husserl through Dilthey, 1916–1925 by Robert C. Scharff
• Steven Crowell

Robert Scharff's new book wants to set the record straight. For too long, scholars have focused on the topic of Heidegger's thinking, being, and have read Being and Time as a hermeneutic revision of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, which, like the latter, "takes positions" on philosophical questions, advances "theses," and, for all its emphasis on subjective experience, invites "objective" assessment. Scharff's alternative picture, focused almost exclusively on Heidegger's lecture courses between 1919 and 1925, looks something like this:

If one carefully examines Heidegger's reading of Dilthey during this period, one will see that Heidegger always approaches Husserl's phenomenology with a "Diltheyan" question in mind: not, What is phenomenological ontology? but, How do I become phenomenological? (148). Heidegger's "becoming phenomenological" is framed by his grasp of the "motivational basis" of Dilthey's hermeneutics, which the latter, a child of his epistemology-dominated time, never explicitly pursues: how to be an "interpreter" rather than a "knower" (xviii), how to discern the "life-concern" (101) that speaks in a philosopher's writings despite being clothed in the "conceptual machinery of secondhand enculturation" (xv). Behind Dilthey's efforts to carve out an "epistemology" of the human sciences, Heidegger locates a mindfulness (Besinnung) that strives "to go along with the living-through of life," attending to what is at issue in its "expressions" (11). Such mindfulness contrasts with Husserl's reflective (reflektierend) attempt to "thematize" life as the topic of a science, and this, Scharff argues, is what animates Heidegger's criticisms of Husserl, not just some overemphasis on "the theoretical" (10).

Scharff's book thus presents Heidegger's "destructive retrieval" of Dilthey as the basis for a "destructive retrieval" of Husserl (87): looking past the distortions of Dilthey's scientistic self-conception, Heidegger identifies an incipient hermeneutic philosophy that motivates a deconstruction of Husserl's reflective-objective "categories" and replaces them with "formal indications," concepts that point us toward the very life from which they emerge (111). Hermeneutic phenomenology is thus an "intensification" of life that illuminates life "from within" rather than distancing itself from the "factic" life-concerns belonging to our historical situation (118).

Scharff presents his interpretation in two stages. Part 1 begins with Dilthey's involvement in the Verstehen-Erklären debate (23–36) and Husserl's arguments against "historicism" (36–41). The contrast with Husserl then frames Heidegger's retrieval of the "standpoint of life," which Dilthey rarely discussed explicitly (49–73). Scharff, the author of a book [End Page 341] on August Comte and a scholar of the history of science, expertly leads us through the nineteenth-century background while elucidating the fundamental tension in Dilthey's work. Drawing on Heidegger's lecture courses, Scharff argues that Heidegger's concern is to "appropriate" Dilthey's concept of life in a phenomenological way, ignoring the neo-Kantian baggage (50). Verstehen is not a method but a clue to "becoming" phenomenological.

Part 2, in turn, examines how this retrieval of life informs Heidegger's appropriation of Husserl. Important here is Scharff's discussion of how Heidegger unpacks the "ambiguities" in Husserl's "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" (88–98), which paves the way for a critical appropriation of Husserl's "principle of all principles" (98–104). Husserl's "principle" intends a move back to lived experience, but this gets lost in the aim of founding a science that "brackets" the natural attitude in favor of the "distancing" attitude of reflection (112). In contrast, the phenomenologist must "stay with" her own life in a Besinnung that is "identical with living-through it" (118). In conclusion, Scharff explains where this leaves us: phenomenology must always remain "provisional," and philosophers should acknowledge what Heidegger's path from Being and Time onward suggests: philosophy is never really about advancing theses and taking positions; it is about avoiding "technique-happiness," staying close to one's own lived experience to find...

审核人：

• 海德格尔成为现象学：罗伯特·C·沙夫（1917-1925）
• 史蒂文·克洛威尔（Steven Crowell）

罗伯特·沙夫（Robert Scharff）的新书想把这个记录弄得直。长期以来，学者一直专注于海德格尔的思想，存在这一主题，并阅读了《存在与时间》作为对胡塞尔先验现象学的诠释学修订版，后者像后者一样，在哲学问题上“占了上风”，推动了“这些论题”的发展。并且，尽管它着重于主观经验，但仍邀请进行“客观”评估。Scharff的替代图片几乎完全专注于1919至1925年间海德格尔的演讲课程，看起来像这样：

如果在此期间仔细检查海德格尔对“狄尔泰”的解读，就会发现海德格尔总是在思考胡塞尔的现象学时会想到一个“狄尔西扬”问题：不是，什么是现象学本体论？但是，我如何成为现象学的？（148）。海德格尔的“成为现象学”是由他对狄尔泰诠释学的“动机基础”的把握构架的，后者是他的认识论主导时代的孩子，从未明确追求：如何成为“解释者”而不是“知识分子” （xviii），如何辨别哲学家著作中所说的“生命关注”（101），尽管穿着“二手文化的概念机器”（xv）。在Dilthey的背后Besinnung致力于“与生活的共处”，关注其“表现形式”中存在的问题（11）。这样的正念对比与胡塞尔的反射（reflektierend）企图“thematize”生活是一门科学的话题，而这，沙尔夫认为，就是动画的“理论”胡塞尔海德格尔的批评，不只是一些过分强调（10）。

从而沙尔夫的书提出海德格尔的“破坏性检索狄尔泰的”作为“基础破坏性胡塞尔的检索”（87）：寻找过去狄尔泰的唯科学自我概念的扭曲，海德格尔标识初始阐释理念，激励胡塞尔的反射的解构-客观的“类别”，并用“形式指示”代替它们，这些概念将我们引向它们出现的真正时光（111）。因此，诠释学现象学是生命的一种“强化”，它从“内部”照亮了生命，而不是使自己脱离了属于我们历史状况的“虚构”生命关注点（118）。

沙夫提出了他的解释，分两个阶段。第一部分从狄尔泰（Dilthey）参与Verstehen-Erklären辩论（23–36）和胡塞尔（Husserl）反对“历史主义”的论点（36–41）开始。然后，与胡塞尔的对比构成了海德格尔对“生活立场”的追寻，狄尔泰很少对此进行明确讨论（49-73）。查尔夫（Scharff ）是奥古斯特·孔德（August Comte）的著作[第341页]的作者，也是科学史学者，他巧妙地带领我们走过了19世纪的背景，同时阐明了狄尔泰著作的根本张力。借鉴海德格尔的演讲课程，沙夫认为海德格尔的关注点是以现象学的方式“适当”狄尔泰的生活概念，而忽略了新康德式的包（（50）。 这不是一种方法，而是“成为”现象学的线索。

反过来，第2部分研究了对生命的这种取回如何使海德格尔对胡塞尔的侵占成为可能。在这里重要的是沙夫对海德格尔如何解开胡塞尔的“严谨的哲学哲学”（88-98）的“歧义”的讨论，这为胡塞尔的“所有原理的原则”（98-104）的批判性铺平了道路。胡塞尔的“原理”打算回到现实生活中，但这迷失于建立一门科学的目的，该科学将自然态度“包围”在有利于反射的“疏远”态度中（112）。相反，现象学家必须在Besinnung中“保留”自己的生活那就是“与生活完全相同”（118）。最后，Scharff解释了这给我们留下了什么：现象学必须始终保持“临时性”，哲学家应该承认海德格尔从《存在与时间》开始的道路所暗示的：哲学从来就不是真正地推进论文和就职。这是关于避免“技术幸福”，紧贴自己的生活经验来寻找...