We characterize the pricing structure in a model of platform competition in which two firms offer horizontally differentiated platforms and two sets of complementors offer products that are exclusive to each platform, respectively. We highlight the presence of indirect network effects: platforms and complementors benefit from the quality and number of firms in their group and suffer from the quality and number of firms in the rival’s group through their effects on prices and market share. We then determine the incentives of platforms to subsidize the independent complementors in an equilibrium. We further analyze the incentives of each platform to form a strategic alliance with complementors through contractual exclusivity or technological compatibility, or to integrate with the complementors. Finally, we discuss the welfare consequences of these strategies.

我们在平台竞争模型中描述了定价结构，其中两家公司提供水平差异化的平台，而两组补充者分别提供每个平台独有的产品。我们强调了间接网络效应的存在：平台和互补者受益于其集团中公司的质量和数量，而由于价格和市场份额的影响而遭受竞争对手集团中公司的质量和数量的困扰。然后，我们确定平台在均衡中补贴独立互补子的动机。我们将进一步分析每个平台通过契约排他性或技术兼容性与补充者结成战略联盟或与补充者整合的动机。最后，