This paper examines the effects of accounting-based thresholds in regulation on growth decisions in the banking industry. To investigate this relation we study changes in growth around the $10 billion asset threshold specified in the Dodd-Frank Act. We first document that, in the years after the new threshold-based regulations are announced, banks slow their asset growth as they approach the threshold and then accelerate their asset growth as they cross the threshold. Next, we document the primary mechanism banks use to achieve each of these changes in growth: reduced deposit growth rates to slow growth and increased acquisition activity to accelerate growth. Finally, we document that, while banks attempt to remain below the threshold, they reduce the growth of their investment portfolio and report a lower return on assets. Also, when banks accelerate growth through acquisition activity, those acquisitions involve larger and riskier target banks. These findings suggest that regulations with accounting-based thresholds can affect growth decisions and profitability in the banking industry.

本文研究了监管中基于会计的阈值对银行业增长决策的影响。为了研究这种关系，我们研究了《多德-弗兰克法案》（Dodd-Frank Act）中指定的100亿美元资产阈值附近的增长变化。我们首先证明，在宣布新的基于门槛的规定之后的几年中，银行在接近门槛时放慢了资产增长速度，而在越过门槛时加速了资产增长。接下来，我们记录银行用于实现增长中的每一个变化的主要机制：降低存款增长率以减慢增长速度，增加收购活动以加速增长。最后，我们证明，尽管银行试图保持在门槛以下，但它们降低了投资组合的增长，并报告了较低的资产收益率。还，当银行通过收购活动加速增长时，这些收购涉及规模更大，风险更高的目标银行。这些发现表明，具有基于会计阈值的法规可能会影响银行业的增长决策和盈利能力。