Abstract

Pascal’s wager is one of the most influential arguments in philosophy and decision theory. This paper reformulates Pascal’s wager in terms of two-outcome finite payoffs (one before death and one after death). The proposed reformulation accentuates the lexicographic nature of decision maker’s preferences. Lexicographic preferences violate the continuity axiom—a standard assumption of many theories of decision making under risk and uncertainty. Since Pascal’s wager assumes lexicographic (i.e., discontinuous) preferences, it is appropriate to represent the latter with lexicographic utility and not conventional expected utility theory.

中文翻译：

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帕斯卡赌注中的词典偏好

摘要

帕斯卡的赌注是哲学和决策理论中最有影响力的论点之一。本文将帕斯卡的赌注重新表述为两种结果的有限收益（一种在死前，另一种在死后）。拟议的重新表述强调了决策者偏好的字典性质。词典偏好​​违反了连续性公理——在风险和不确定性下的许多决策理论的标准假设。由于帕斯卡的赌注假定了字典式（即不连续的）偏好，因此用字典式效用而不是传统的预期效用理论来表示后者是合适的。