As standardly conceived, an illusion is a case in which appearances in at least one respect conflict with reality. Such a conflict only obtains in cases where a non-F object appears to be F—appears F in a ‘committal’ way, as I put it. It is, however, possible for an object to appear F in a non-committal way—i.e. without appearing to be F. The paper discusses a number of recent naïve realist attempts to account for illusion. Drawing on the distinction between committal and non-committal appearances, I argue that none of the proposals is able to account for illusion as standardly conceived.

中文翻译：

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天真的现实主义和幻觉问题

按照标准的设想，幻觉是一种现象，其中至少在一个方面与现实相冲突。只有在非F对象看起来是 F的情况下才会出现这种冲突——正如我所说的那样，以“承诺”的方式出现F。然而，一个对象有可能以一种不明确的方式出现F ——即没有出现F。这篇论文讨论了最近一些天真的现实主义者试图解释错觉。根据承诺表象和非承诺表象之间的区别，我认为没有一个提议能够按照标准构想来解释错觉。