We study the phenomenon of strategic group polarization in which members take more extreme actions than their preferences. The analysis is relevant for a broad range of formal and informal group settings, including social media, online platforms, sales teams, corporate and academic committees, and political action committees. In our model, agents with private preferences choose a public action (voice opinions), and the mean of their actions represents the group’s realized outcome. They face a trade-off between influencing the group decision and truth-telling. In a simultaneous move game, agents strategically shade their actions towards the extreme. The strategic group influence motive can create substantial polarization in actions and group decisions even when the preferences are relatively moderate. Compared to a simultaneous game, a randomized sequential actions game lowers polarization when agents’ preferences are relatively similar. Sequential actions can even lead to moderation if the later agents have moderate preferences. Endogenizing the order of moves (through a first-price sealed-bid auction) always increases polarization, but it is also welfare enhancing. Our findings can help group leaders, firms, and platforms design mechanisms that moderate polarization, e.g., the choice of speaking order, the group size, and the knowledge members have of others’ preferences and actions.

我们研究了战略群体两极分化的现象，在这种现象中，成员采取了比他们的偏好更多的极端行动。该分析与广泛的正式和非正式小组设置有关，包括社交媒体，在线平台，销售团队，公司和学术委员会以及政治行动委员会。在我们的模型中，具有私人偏好的代理选择公共行动（声音意见），并且他们的行动平均值代表了小组的已实现结果。他们面临着在影响团队决策和讲真话之间做出权衡的问题。在同时移动游戏中，特工从战略上将自己的行动掩盖到极致。即使偏好较为温和，战略性群体影响动机也会在行动和群体决策中产生实质性的两极分化。与同步游戏相比，当特工的偏好相对相似时，随机顺序行动博弈会降低两极化。如果后来的代理人有中等偏爱，那么顺序动作甚至可能导致节制。内化移动顺序（通过一口价密封竞标）总是会加剧两极分化，但同时也会增加福利。我们的发现可以帮助小组领导者，公司和平台设计适度分化的机制，例如说话顺序的选择，小组的规模以及成员对他人的偏好和行动的了解。但它也可以增进福利。我们的发现可以帮助小组领导者，公司和平台设计适度分化的机制，例如说话顺序的选择，小组的规模以及成员对他人的偏好和行动的了解。但它也可以增进福利。我们的发现可以帮助小组领导者，公司和平台设计适度分化的机制，例如说话顺序的选择，小组的规模以及成员对他人的偏好和行动的了解。