This article explores the relation between belief-like imaginings and the establishment of imaginary worlds (often called fictional worlds). After outlining the various assumptions my argument is premised on, I argue that belief-like imaginings, in themselves, do not render their content true in the imaginary world to which they pertain. I show that this claim applies not only to imaginative projects in which we are instructed or intend to imagine certain propositions, but also to spontaneous imaginative projects. After arguing that, like guided imaginative projects, spontaneous projects involve specific imaginary truths, I conclude that imaginative projects, whether spontaneous or deliberate, comprise not only imaginings, but also mental acts of determining such truths.

中文翻译：

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不单靠想象：关于想象世界是如何建立的

本文探讨了类似信念的想象与想象世界（通常称为虚构世界）。在概述了我的论点所基于的各种假设之后，我认为类似信念的想象本身并不能使它们的内容在它们所属的想象世界中成为真实。我表明，这一主张不仅适用于我们被指示或打算想象某些命题的想象项目，而且也适用于自发的想象项目。在论证了自发项目与引导的想象项目一样，自发项目涉及特定的想象真理之后，我得出结论，无论是自发的还是有意的，想象项目不仅包括想象，还包括确定这些真理的​​心理行为。