This essay unites current philosophical thinking on imagination with a burgeoning debate in the philosophy of memory over whether episodic remembering is simply a kind of imagining. So far, this debate has been hampered by a lack of clarity in the notion of imagining at issue. Several options are considered and constructive imagining is identified as the relevant kind. Next, a functionalist account of episodic remembering is defended as a means to establishing two key points: first, one need not defend a factive (or causalist) view of remembering in order to hold that causal connections to past experiences are essential to how rememberings are typed; and, second, current theories that equate remembering with imagining are in fact consistent with a functionalist theory that includes causal connections in its account of what it is to remember. This suggests that remembering is not a kind of imagining and clarifies what it would take to establish the contrary.

中文翻译：

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什么样的想象可能会记住？

这篇文章将当前关于想象力的哲学思考与记忆哲学中关于情景记忆是否仅仅是一种想象的新兴争论结合起来。到目前为止，这场辩论一直受到争议的想象概念缺乏明确性的阻碍。几个选项被考虑和建设性想象被识别为相关种类。接下来，功能主义对情景记忆的解释被认为是确立两个关键点的一种手段：首先，人们不需要为记忆的事实（或因果论）观点辩护，以坚持与过去经历的因果联系对于记忆如何是必不可少的。打字；其次，当前将记忆等同于想象的理论实际上与功能主义理论是一致的，该理论在其对记忆是什么的解释中包含了因果关系。这表明记忆不是一种想象，并阐明了建立相反的东西需要什么。