Distributed cooperative control has been used as a preferred secondary control strategy for maintaining frequency synchronization and voltage restoration in cyber-physical AC microgrids due to its flexibility, scalability and better computational performance. However, such a control system is susceptible to potential cyber attacks, i.e., false data injection (FDI) attacks. To this end, this article introduces a hidden layer based attack-resilient distributed cooperative control algorithm to solve the problem of the secondary control of islanded microgrids under FDI attacks. In comparison to the existing attack-resilient distributed control methods, the proposed controller with sufficient large α can mitigate the adverse effects of time dependent FDI attacks on actuators, sensors and communication links of the control system, and is also robust to state dependent FDI attacks. Furthermore, the algorithm is applicable even when all DGs and communications are compromised. Finally, the efficiency of the proposed controller is evaluated for a test microgrid with 4 DGs under different types of attack.

中文翻译：

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孤岛微电网抗 FDI 攻击的分布式二次控制策略


分布式协作控制由于其灵活性、可扩展性和更好的计算性能，已被用作网络物理交流微电网中维持频率同步和电压恢复的首选二次控制策略。然而，这样的控制系统容易受到潜在的网络攻击，即虚假数据注入（FDI）攻击。为此，本文提出一种基于隐含层的抗攻击分布式协同控制算法，解决FDI攻击下孤岛微电网的二次控制问题。与现有的抗攻击分布式控制方法相比，所提出的具有足够大α的控制器可以减轻时间相关的FDI攻击对控制系统的执行器、传感器和通信链路的不利影响，并且对状态相关的FDI攻击也具有鲁棒性。此外，即使所有 DG 和通信都受到损害，该算法也适用。最后，针对具有 4 个 DG 的测试微电网在不同类型的攻击下评估所提出的控制器的效率。