Compared with centralized control, distributed control for microgrids offers higher reliability and scalability. However, distributed control faces severe problems for maintaining the microgrid cybersecurity, which is due to the absence of central controllers for monitoring participating generation unit activities. This article proposes an observer-based resilient distributed control for AC microgrids that estimates and compensates false data injection (FDI) attacks on sensors and actuators. The proposed resilient control relies on an integrated distributed control structure, which restores the rated frequency/voltage and offers the proportional active/reactive power sharing with reduced exchanges of control signals. The proposed control has no limitation on the number of disrupted DGs and does not need access to the attack information. The H ∞ output feedback control is applied to guarantee the L 2-gain boundedness of the control system. Several case studies are presented to verify the effectiveness of the proposed resilient distributed control in the PSCAD/EMTDC platform.

中文翻译：

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基于观察者的弹性集成分布式控制，抵御孤岛交流微电网中传感器和执行器的网络攻击


与集中控制相比，微电网分布式控制具有更高的可靠性和可扩展性。然而，分布式控制在维护微电网网络安全方面面临着严重的问题，这是由于缺乏中央控制器来监控参与的发电机组活动。本文提出了一种基于观测器的交流微电网弹性分布式控制，可估计和补偿对传感器和执行器的虚假数据注入 (FDI) 攻击。所提出的弹性控制依赖于集成的分布式控制结构，该结构可以恢复额定频率/电压，并提供按比例的有功/无功功率共享，同时减少控制信号的交换。所提出的控制对被破坏的 DG 的数量没有限制，并且不需要访问攻击信息。采用H ∞ 输出反馈控制来保证控制系统的L 2 增益有界性。提出了几个案例研究来验证 PSCAD/EMTDC 平台中所提出的弹性分布式控制的有效性。