The proliferation of distributed energy assets necessitates the provision of flexibility to efficiently operate modern distribution systems. In this article, we propose a flexibility market through which the DSO may acquire flexibility services from asset aggregators in order to maintain network voltages and currents within safe limits. A max-min fair formulation is proposed for the allocation of flexibility. Since the DSO is not aware of each aggregator’s local flexibility costs, we show that strategic misreporting can lead to severe loss of efficiency. Using mechanism design theory, we provide a mechanism that makes it a payoff-maximizing strategy for each aggregator to make truthful bids to the flexibility market. While typical truthful mechanisms only work when the objective is the maximization of Social Welfare, the proposed mechanism lets the DSO achieve incentive compatibility and optimality for the max-min fairness objective.

中文翻译：

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公平高效的DSO灵活性市场机制设计

分布式能源资产的激增需要提供灵活性以有效地运行现代配电系统。在本文中，我们提出了一个灵活性市场，DSO可以通过该市场从资产聚合商那里获得灵活性服务，以将网络电压和电流保持在安全范围内。提出了最大-最小公平公式来分配灵活性。由于DSO并不了解每个聚合器的本地灵活性成本，因此我们表明，战略性的误报可能会导致效率严重下降。使用机制设计理论，我们提供了一种机制，使每个聚合器可以在最大程度上实现收益最大化，从而对灵活性市场进行真实的竞标。虽然典型的真实机制仅在目标是实现社会福利最大化时起作用，