Signatories, guarantors and stakeholders of peace treaties and global political agreements (GPA) need reliable information on the agreement’s implementation to track progress, ensure compliance and prevent renewed conflict. Implementation monitoring mechanisms (IMMs) are, therefore, an important component of peace and transitional governance processes. Whereas monitoring can be entrusted to an independent third party, the signatories of Zimbabwe’s GPA set up a Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC). This article outlines the implementation of the GPA and discusses the hybrid design and workings of JOMIC, which sought to build peace among monitors from power-sharing parties, who jointly observed the agreement’s implementation. It argues that JOMIC was not a viable substitution for an independent IMM despite having some merit in observing political violence and gathering information for the power-sharing parties. JOMIC’s basic concept of permitting political elites to monitor their own compliance with the agreement was impractical, its proceedings non-transparent and its outputs of little use to guarantors and stakeholders. The absence of an official independent IMM, for which civil society monitors could not fully compensate, impeded the transitional governance process and its facilitation by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which was meant to guarantee that the GPA was implemented. Zimbabwe’s GPA offers cautionary lessons for the design of implementation mechanisms that serve multiple purposes, which can compromise the quality of monitoring. It points to the need to institutionalise implementation monitoring in the African peace and security architecture to improve the ability of the African Union and regional economic communities to guarantee that agreements that they facilitate are implemented.

和平条约和全球政治协议 (GPA) 的签署方、担保方和利益相关者需要有关协议执行情况的可靠信息，以跟踪进展、确保合规并防止再次发生冲突。因此，实施监督机制 (IMM) 是和平与过渡治理进程的重要组成部分。鉴于监督可以委托给独立的第三方，津巴布韦 GPA 的签署国成立了联合监督和执行委员会 (JOMIC)。本文概述了 GPA 的实施，并讨论了 JOMIC 的混合设计和运作方式，JOMIC 试图在共同观察协议实施的权力分享各方的监督者之间建立和平。它认为 JOMIC 不是独立 IMM 的可行替代品，尽管在观察政治暴力和为权力分享党收集信息方面具有一些优点。JOMIC 允许政治精英监督他们自己遵守协议的基本概念是不切实际的，其程序不透明，其输出对担保人和利益相关者几乎没有用处。由于缺乏官方独立的 IMM，民间社会监督人员无法完全弥补，这阻碍了过渡治理进程及其由南部非洲发展共同体 (SADC) 提供的便利，该进程旨在保证 GPA 的实施。津巴布韦的 GPA 为设计服务于多种目的的实施机制提供了警示，这可能会影响监测质量。