ABSTRACT

Though reciprocity is an important aspect of coercive diplomacy, little is known about whether and when sanctioned countries (i.e., targets) respond to foreign pressure with their own counter-sanctions. The purpose of this article is to offer a comprehensive analysis of the conditions under which targets are more likely to employ economic counter-measures against their senders. Analyzing data for sanctions reciprocity episodes in the Threats and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) dataset, we find that targets with wealthier economies, less democratic regimes, or higher trade dependence on their senders are more likely to initiate reciprocal sanctions. Our findings also denote that sanctions reciprocity is more likely when targets are subject to sanctions by senders with poor economies or when the issue that instigates the initial sanctions is less salient. As the first cross-national, quantitative analysis of sanctions reciprocity, our analysis provides a more complete picture of how strategic ties between senders and targets unfold, and why some sanctions are more likely to fail or result in stalemate due to counter-sanctions employed by targets.

摘要

尽管互惠是强制外交的一个重要方面，但关于受制裁国家（即目标）是否以及何时以自己的反制裁回应外国压力却知之甚少。本文的目的是对目标更有可能对其发送者采取经济反措施的条件进行全面分析。通过分析经济制裁威胁和实施 (TIES) 数据集中的制裁互惠事件数据，我们发现经济体较富裕、民主制度较低或贸易对其发送方的依赖程度较高的目标更有可能发起互惠制裁。我们的研究结果还表明，当目标受到经济不景气的发件人的制裁或引发初始制裁的问题不那么突出时，制裁互惠更有可能发生。作为对制裁互惠的第一个跨国定量分析，我们的分析更全面地说明了发送方和目标之间的战略关系如何展开，以及为什么某些制裁更有可能因制裁互惠而失败或导致僵局。目标。