Sundaram and Inkpen (2004a, 2004b) proposed shareholder value maximization (SVM) as the preferred corporate objective since it alone impels the firm to implement strategies that enhance outcomes for all stakeholders. Goranova and Ryan (2021) argue that three recent developments – common ownership, decoupling of owners from managers, and greater divergence in shareholder interests – call into question our SVM view. We dispute their arguments: (i) The developments they cite are overplayed in the literature, and may not matter much for SVM; (ii) To the extent they do matter, their concern is less about SVM’s relevance as corporate objective but more whether these developments bias decisions towards the short-term. We do not disagree since, after all, Sundaram and Inkpen (2004a) is solely about SVM for the long-term; (iii) If anything, Goranova and Ryan’s (2021) proposed solution of ‘strategic corporate governance’ can be viewed as an endorsement of the relevance and enduring primacy of SVM for the long-term.

中文翻译：

---

股东价值最大化作为首选企业目标的持久性

Sundaram 和 Inkpen (2004a, 2004b) 提出股东价值最大化 (SVM) 作为首选的公司目标，因为它单独促使公司实施为所有利益相关者提高成果的战略。Goranova 和 Ryan (2021) 认为，最近的三项发展——共同所有权、所有者与管理者的脱钩以及股东利益的更大分歧——对我们的 SVM 观点提出了质疑。我们对他们的论点提出异议：（i）他们引用的发展在文献中被夸大了，对 SVM 可能无关紧要；(ii) 就它们确实重要的程度而言，他们关心的不是 SVM 作为公司目标的相关性，而是这些发展是否会使决策偏向于短期。我们并不反对，因为毕竟 Sundaram 和 Inkpen (2004a) 只是关于长期的SVM; (iii) 如果有的话，Goranova 和 Ryan (2021) 提出的“战略公司治理”解决方案可以被视为对 SVM 长期相关性和持久首要地位的认可。