Recently, many scientists have become concerned about an excessive number of failures to reproduce statistically significant effects. The situation has become dire enough that the situation has been named the ‘reproducibility crisis’. After reviewing the relevant literature to confirm the observation that scientists do indeed view replication as currently problematic, I explain in philosophical terms why the replication of empirical phenomena, such as statistically significant effects, is important for scientific progress. Following that explanation, I examine various diagnoses of the reproducibility crisis, and argue that for the majority of scientists the crisis is due, at least in part, to a form of publication bias. This conclusion sets the stage for an assessment of the view that evidential relations in science are inherently value-laden, a view championed by Heather Douglas and Kevin Elliott. I argue, in response to Douglas and Elliott, and as motivated by the meta-scientific resistance scientists harbour to a publication bias, that if we advocate the value-ladenness of science the result would be a deepening of the reproducibility crisis.

最近，许多科学家开始担心过多的失败来重现统计上的显着影响。这种情况已经变得非常可怕，以至于这种情况被称为“再现性危机”。在回顾了相关文献以确认科学家确实认为复制目前存在问题的观察后，我用哲学术语解释了为什么经验现象的复制，例如统计显着效应，对科学进步很重要。根据这种解释，我检查了对可重复性危机的各种诊断，并认为对于大多数科学家来说，危机至少部分是由于某种形式的发表偏见造成的。这一结论为评估科学中的证据关系本质上充满价值的观点奠定了基础，Heather Douglas 和 Kevin Elliott 倡导的观点。我认为，作为对 Douglas 和 Elliott 的回应，并且受元科学阻力的驱使，科学家们怀有发表偏见，如果我们提倡科学的价值负载，结果将是可重复性危机的加深。