Kawaguchi et al. (2021) use data from the Labour Force Survey of Japan to examine the changes in employment rates from 2000 to the present. They show that Japan's employment rate has risen by 1.1 percentage points from 2000 to 2019, despite the continued population aging. According to their decomposition results, had the participation behavior stayed constant at the 2000 level, the employment rate would have decreased by 5.2 percentage points in 2019. Kawaguchi et al. demonstrate that the primary contributors to this rise were females aged 25–64. Their reserach further shows that: (i) most of the rise in female participation is a shift from out-of-the-labor-force to employment, not so much from unemployment to employment; (ii) there was increased participation of women in the health care and social welfare sector; (iii) the large rise in female employment rates is not explained by various family policies (such as expanded child daycare or the public provision of elderly care); and (iv) the share of temporary employment did not increase during Abenomics. Kawaguchi et al. also examine the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on employment rates, and conclude that the fall in employment was modest.

As Kawaguchi et al. show, Japan has faced a gradual shrinkage of its labor supply, which poses a labor shortage pressure. According to Japan's population census and its predictions (Statistics Bureau of Japan, 2020), the number of people aged 15 or over was 108 million in 2000, 111 million in 2013, and 111 million in 2019. Therefore, the total number of those aged 15 or over has not decreased much from 2000 to the present, because of increased longevity. In contrast, the number of people aged 15–64 was 86.4 million in 2000, 79.0 million in 2013, and 75.0 million in 2019. During the time of this supply pressure, the overall employment rates (the denominator of which is the population aged 15 or over) did not fall, thanks to the significant increase in female participation rates. During the period of Abenomics, the baby boomers have retired, so supply pressure had been present. Baby boomers were in their early 50s in 2000; they were in their mid-60s at the start of Abenomics; and they reached around 70 in 2019. Even with the demand shock due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Japanese labor market did not become so weak, possibly because of the underlying supply pressure.

I have two major comments. The first is about the nature of women's participation behavior. In the decomposition, the fact that female participation has risen over time could represent two different behaviors. First, later cohorts of women may participate more in the labor market in the same age range than did earlier cohorts. If later cohorts of women are less likely to quit the labor market upon marriage or childbirth than earlier cohorts, that would increase age-specific participation rates over time. Second, the same rise could happen if more women who were out of the labor force start working (re-enter the labor market) as they age. These two behaviors result in the same age-specific rise in female participation rates. Yet, in terms of individual behaviors, they mean different things. Section 2.4 of Kawaguchi et al. reports the transition from out-of-the-labor-force to employment increased among those aged 15–34 from 2013 to 2020. In contrast, the same transition was unchanged for those aged 35–54. This pattern might suggest that the re-entry to the labor market has increased after 2013. However, the increase for those aged 15–34 could come from other channels. For instance, if more students take part-time jobs than before, the inflow to employment increases.

My second comment is about the long-term trend versus the impact of Abenomics. The rise in female participation is a long-term phenomenon that started before 1980. In Kawaguchi et al.'s figure 4, the rise in employment rates of females aged 25–44 seems to have been following the long-term trend, rather than any structural change taking place after 2013. In contrast, the rise in employment of females aged 45–64 seems to have accelerated after 2013, during the period of Abenomics. The reasons why we see these differences across age groups, and what their implications are, may be worth further investigation. If Kawaguchi et al. wish to assess Abenomics' impact, then perhaps the long-term trend (that is, the changes that would have happened without Abenomics) should be separated out.

川口等人。( 2021 ) 使用来自日本劳动力调查的数据来检查从 2000 年到现在的就业率变化。他们表明，尽管人口持续老龄化，日本的就业率从 2000 年到 2019 年上升了 1.1 个百分点。根据他们的分解结果，如果参与行为保持在 2000 年的水平，2019 年的就业率将下降 5.2 个百分点。 Kawaguchi等. 证明这一增长的主要贡献者是 25-64 岁的女性。他们的研究进一步表明：(i) 女性参与率的上升大部分是从劳动力外向就业的转变，而不是从失业转向就业；㈡ 妇女更多地参与保健和社会福利部门；(iii) 女性就业率的大幅上升并非由各种家庭政策（例如扩大儿童日托或公共提供养老服务）来解释；(iv) 在安倍经济学期间，临时就业的比例没有增加。川口等人。还研究了 COVID-19 大流行对就业率的影响，并得出结论认为就业下降幅度不大。

正如川口等人。显示，日本面临劳动力供给逐渐萎缩，劳动力短缺压力不断加大。根据日本人口普查及其预测（日本统计局，  2020)，2000 年 15 岁及以上人口为 1.08 亿，2013 年为 1.11 亿，2019 年为 1.11 亿。 因此，15 岁及以上人口总数从 2000 年到现在并没有太大下降，因为延长寿命。相比之下，2000 年 15-64 岁人口为 8640 万，2013 年为 7900 万，2019 年为 7500 万。或以上）没有下降，这要归功于女性参与率的显着提高。在安倍经济学时期，婴儿潮一代已经退休，供应压力一直存在。婴儿潮一代在 2000 年 50 岁出头；他们在安倍经济学开始时已经 60 多岁了；他们在 2019 年达到了 70 左右。

我有两个主要意见。首先是关于女性参与行为的性质。在分解中，女性参与度随时间增加的事实可能代表两种不同的行为。首先，在同一年龄范围内，较晚的妇女群体可能比较早的群体更多地参与劳动力市场。如果较晚的妇女群体在结婚或生育后退出劳动力市场的可能性低于较早的群体，那么随着时间的推移，特定年龄的参与率将提高。其次，如果更多退出劳动力市场的女性随着年龄的增长开始工作（重新进入劳动力市场），同样的增长可能会发生。这两种行为导致女性参与率在相同的年龄增长。然而，就个人行为而言，它们意味着不同的东西。Kawaguchi等人的第 2.4 节. 报告称，从 2013 年到 2020 年，15-34 岁人群从失业到就业的转变有所增加。相比之下，35-54 岁人群的同样转变没有变化。这种模式可能表明重新进入劳动力市场的人数在 2013 年之后有所增加。然而，15-34 岁人群的增加可能来自其他渠道。例如，如果更多的学生从事兼职工作，那么就业流入就会增加。

我的第二个评论是关于长期趋势与安倍经济学的影响。女性参与率的上升是 1980 年之前开始的长期现象。在 Kawaguchi等人的图 4 中，25-44 岁女性就业率的上升似乎一直在遵循长期趋势，而不是2013 年之后发生的任何结构性变化。相比之下，在 2013 年之后的安倍经济学时期，45-64 岁女性的就业增长似乎加速了。我们看到不同年龄组之间存在这些差异的原因及其影响可能值得进一步调查。如果川口等人。如果希望评估安倍经济学的影响，那么也许应该分离出长期趋势（即没有安倍经济学会发生的变化）。