ABSTRACT

There is a longstanding debate in philosophy concerning the relationship between intention and intentional action. According to the Single Phenomenon View, while one need not intend to A in order to A intentionally, one nevertheless needs to have an A-relevant intention. This view has recently come under criticism by those who think that one can A intentionally without any relevant intention at all. On this view, neither distal nor proximal intentions are necessary for intentional action. In this paper we present the results of two studies that explore folk ascriptions of proximal intentions and intentional actions in garden-variety, non-moral cases. Our findings suggest a very tight relationship between the two. We argue that the results from these two studies cohere with the Single Phenomenon View and give theorists who reject this view on conceptual grounds reason to worry.

摘要

关于意图和有意行为之间的关系，哲学界一直存在争论。根据单一现象观，虽然一个人不需要为了有意识地想要A而想要A，但仍然需要有一个与A相关的意图。这种观点最近受到了那些认为可以A故意没有任何相关意图。根据这种观点，有意行动既不需要远侧意图也不需要近侧意图。在本文中，我们展示了两项研究的结果，这些研究探索了各种非道德案例中近端意图和故意行为的民间归因。我们的发现表明两者之间的关系非常紧密。我们认为，这两项研究的结果与单一现象观点一致，并让那些在概念上拒绝这种观点的理论家有理由担心。