Current income tax systems are characterized by an asymmetric treatment of gains and losses. This implies that the (effective) tax rate on profits exceeds that on losses. We study the contractural relationship between two parties (the principal and the agent). For example, such a relationship occurs if a franchisee (agent) contracts with a franchiser (principal) or when a new partner (agent) enters a partnership (principal). We focus on the effect of the agent's asymmetric taxation on the principal's optimal contract and show that the principal's expected profit is a non-monotonous function of the agent's loss tax rate. In particular, we show that the principal can be strictly better off if the agent is taxed more heavily. This result stands in contrast to the existing literature, which has only shown that lower taxation at the agent's level increases the principal's expected profit.

当前的所得税系统的特征是对收益和损失的不对称处理。这意味着对利润的（有效）税率超过了对损失的税率。我们研究了两方（委托人和代理人）之间的契约关系。例如，如果被特许人（代理人）与特许人（主要人）签约，或者当新的合伙人（代理人）进入合伙人（主要人）时，就会发生这种关系。我们关注代理人不对称征税对委托人最优合同的影响，并表明委托人的预期利润是代理人亏损税率的非单调函数。特别是，我们表明，如果对代理人加重税金，则委托人可以严格地享受更好的待遇。此结果与现有文献相反，