ABSTRACT

In this essay, I contend that the usually neglected Fundamental Law of the Commonwealth, which commands that the essential rights of the sovereign be retained by the sovereign, imposes substantial limitations on the sovereign’s power, where substantial limitations mean limitations that render some options strictly closed for the sovereign. The option that the Fundamental Law strictly closes for the sovereign, I argue, is the transferral or renouncement of any of his essential rights. Therefore, I follow David Dyzenhaus and Thomas Poole in arguing that Hobbes’s absolutism is constrained; but, by focusing on The Fundamental Law overlooked by them, I suggest that Hobbes recognises substantial – and not just formal – limitations on the sovereign’s power. Secondly, I claim that the Fundamental Law, given that it arises from the ‘the Essence of Sovereignty’, is to be understood as a constitutive principle of sovereignty and so that, as such, it needs no external enforcement. This means that the Fundamental Law can constrain the sovereign without the need of a ‘Judge above [the sovereign with the capacity] to punish him’ – which, as Hobbes points out, ‘[would imply] making a new Sovereign’ and, thus, trigger an infinite regress.

摘要

在这篇文章中，我认为通常被忽视的《联邦基本法》要求主权者保留主权者的基本权利，它对主权者的权力施加了实质性限制，其中实质性限制意味着限制使某些选项严格关闭为君主。我认为，基本法严格限制主权者的选择是转让或放弃他的任何基本权利。因此，我追随大卫·迪岑豪斯和托马斯·普尔的观点，认为霍布斯的绝对主义是受约束的；但是，通过关注被他们忽视的基本法则，我建议霍布斯承认实质性——而不仅仅是形式上的——对主权权力的限制。其次，我主张，鉴于基本法源于“主权的本质”，它应被理解为主权的构成性原则，因此，它不需要外部强制执行。这意味着基本法可以约束主权者，而不需要“法官高于[有能力的主权]来惩罚他”——正如霍布斯指出的那样，“[将暗示]建立一个新的主权”，因此，触发无限回归。