A recent debate on leniency policies is the interplay between the public and the private competition law enforcement. The lack of a well-established set of rules regarding damage claims may be harming the effectiveness of the Brazilian Leniency Program, either by discouraging the wrongdoers from applying for leniency in already formed cartels or by not being threatening enough to deter the cartel formation. The paper objective is to analyze the best policies for leniency applicants regarding the damage liability in Brazil. We conclude that the optimal policy is providing immunity to the leniency applicant, and after that the damage claim lawsuits can be encouraged with no undesirable effects. Extensions confirm the following: the immunity is even more effective when there is risk of betrayal; the immunity is the best policy in the case of ex-post leniency; the immunity is the optimal policy when there is no bankruptcy, otherwise the applicant liability should be the minimum necessary to avoid the bankruptcy; immunity regarding criminal sanctions for individuals is the optimal policy; for international cartels, the optimal policy is a combination of immunity regarding damage claims in all jurisdictions. JEL codes: L13; L41; L44

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巴西卡特尔成员的宽大处理和损害责任

最近关于宽大政策的辩论是公共和私人竞争执法之间的相互作用。缺乏一套完善的关于损害索赔的规则可能会损害巴西宽大处理计划的有效性，要么阻止不法行为者对已经形成的卡特尔申请宽大处理，要么没有足够的威胁来阻止卡特尔的形成。本文的目的是分析宽大处理申请人在巴西损害赔偿责任方面的最佳政策。我们得出的结论是，最优政策是为宽大申请人提供豁免权，之后可以鼓励损害索赔诉讼，而不会产生不良影响。扩展证实了以下几点：当有背叛的风险时，免疫力会更加有效；在事后宽大处理的情况下，豁免是最好的政策；豁免是没有破产时的最优政策，否则申请人的责任应该是避免破产所必需的最低限度；个人刑事制裁豁免是最佳政策；对于国际卡特尔而言，最佳政策是在所有司法管辖区对损害索赔的豁免权相结合。JEL 代码：L13；L41; L44