Abstract

Scholars continue to debate why states repay their debts to foreign creditors. The existing literature stresses the short-term economic and political costs that deter default, focusing on reputational damage, creditor reprisals, spillover costs and loss of office. International Relations scholars and economists have largely tested these explanations using quantitative methods, framing their analyses as a choice between default and non-default driven by the rational interests of states or actors within them. The three books considered here draw on qualitative methods to refine and sometimes challenge the prevailing wisdom, offering valuable insights concerning the many types and wider-ranging causes of sovereign default. These books reveal that default is not a binary outcome but instead a spectrum ranging from unilateral repudiation through to cooperative restructuring. Furthermore, governments sometimes default for economically irrational reasons, reflecting shifts in domestic-political interests or changes in state identity. This new literature also raises important questions for future researchers, especially about when default can be beneficial and how it can affect long-term relations between states.

摘要

学者们继续争论为什么国家要向外国债权人偿还债务。现有文献强调阻止违约的短期经济和政治成本，重点关注声誉损害、债权人报复、溢出成本和失去职位。国际关系学者和经济学家在很大程度上使用定量方法测试了这些解释，将他们的分析构建为由国家或其中行为者的理性利益驱动的违约和非违约之间的选择。这里考虑的三本书利用定性方法来提炼并有时挑战盛行的智慧，提供关于主权违约的多种类型和更广泛原因的宝贵见解。这些书揭示了违约不是一个二元结果，而是从单方面拒绝到合作重组的范围。此外，政府有时会出于经济上的非理性原因违约，这反映了国内政治利益的转变或国家认同的变化。这些新文献也为未来的研究人员提出了重要的问题，尤其是关于违约何时有益以及它如何影响国家之间的长期关系。