US transmission systems and wholesale electricity markets, albeit federally regulated, often span across multiple state jurisdictions. In this environment, state regulators can strategically exploit this techno-economic coupling to advance their clean energy policy goals at the expense of neighboring jurisdictions. This paper investigates strategic regulatory competition to understand its effect on achieving Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS). We formulate a chance-constrained equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (CC-EPEC), which considers multiple state regulators, acting in coordination with in-state power companies, to implement RPS goals in the least-cost manner. To solve this CC-EPEC, we customize a Progressive Hedging (PH) algorithm. The case study uses the CCEPEC and PH algorithm to analyze the effects of state regulatory competition in the ISO New England system.

中文翻译：

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计算战略脱碳路径：机会约束均衡问题

美国输电系统和电力批发市场虽然受联邦监管，但通常跨越多个州辖区。在这种环境下，州监管机构可以战略性地利用这种技术经济耦合来推进其清洁能源政策目标，而牺牲邻近司法管辖区的利益。本文调查了战略监管竞争，以了解其对实现可再生投资组合标准 (RPS) 的影响。我们用均衡约束 (CC-EPEC) 制定了一个机会约束均衡问题，它考虑了多个州监管机构，与州内电力公司合作，以最低成本的方式实施 RPS 目标。为了解决这个 CC-EPEC，我们定制了一个渐进式对冲 (PH) 算法。