Recent studies suggest that Muslim military conquest (632–1100 CE) generated an institutional equilibrium with deleterious long-run political economy effects. This equilibrium was predicated on mamluk institutions: the use of elite slave soldiers (mamluks) and non-hereditary property rights over agricultural lands to compensate them (iqta). This paper evaluates this historical narrative by exploring the accuracy of its initial step. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, I show that conquest changed institutions in conquered territories. I then provide suggestive evidence that the presence and efficacy of mamluk institutions affected this institutional configuration and that leaders survived longer in power during the conquest period.

最近的研究表明，穆斯林的军事征服（公元 632-1100 年）产生了一种制度均衡，具有有害的长期政治经济影响。这种平衡基于马穆鲁克制度：使用精英奴隶兵（马穆鲁克）和对农业土地的非世袭财产权来补偿他们（iqta）。本文通过探索其初始步骤的准确性来评估这一历史叙述。使用差异中的差异策略，我表明征服改变了被征服领土上的制度。然后我提供了暗示性证据证明马穆鲁克的存在和功效 制度影响了这种制度配置，并且领导者在征服时期的掌权时间更长。