Has the occurrence of “extreme capital flow movements”—episodes of sudden surges, stops, flight and retrenchment—changed since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC)? And was the period at the outset of the Covid Crisis any different? This paper addresses these questions by updating and building on the dataset and methodology introduced in Forbes and Warnock (2012) to calculate the occurrence of sharp capital flow movements by foreigners and domestics into and out of individual countries. The results suggest that the occurrence of these extreme capital flow movements has not increased since the GFC, including during the early phases of the Covid Crisis (the first half of 2020). The drivers of these episodes, however, appear to have changed since the GFC. Extreme capital flow movements are less correlated with changes in global risk and more correlated with changes in oil prices. More generally, what used to be large global “waves” in international capital flows have more recently become more idiosyncratic “ripples”.

自全球金融危机（GFC）以来，“极端资本流动”的发生（突然激增，停止，逃离和紧缩的情况）发生了变化吗？Covid危机开始时的时期有什么不同吗？本文通过更新和建立在《福布斯》和《沃诺克》（2012年）中引入的数据集和方法论来解决这些问题，以计算外国人和本国资本流入和流出单个国家的急剧资本流动的发生。结果表明，这些极端资本流动的发生并没有自全球金融危机以来（包括在Covid危机的早期阶段（2020年上半年））有所增加。但是，自全球金融危机以来，这些事件的驱动因素似乎已经发生了变化。极端的资本流动与全球风险的变化相关性较小，而与石油价格的变化相关性较大。更普遍地讲，过去在国际资本流动中曾经是大型的全球“浪潮”，最近已变得更加特有的“涟漪”。