Remanufacturing, especially third-party remanufacturing, has become an important option for original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to effectively balance the economic benefits and environmental impacts of their operations. Further, capital constraint and financing behavior have critical impact on the operations of OEMs, especially small- and medium-sized OEMs. Hence, we aim to explore how the OEM’s capital constraint and financing behavior will affect its selection preference regarding the two sub-modes of third-party remanufacturing: outsourcing and authorization. To this end, we consider a dyadic closed-loop supply chain consisting of a leading third-party remanufacturer (TPR) and a capital-constrained OEM. Taking the case of no capital constraint as benchmark, the choice preference of remanfuacturing modes between outsourcing and authorization is investigated under the case of capital constraint and financing portfolio (including trade credit and bank loan). The findings are as follows. Compared with the benchmark case of no capital constraint, under the financing portfolio, the OEM’s choice preference shifts from outsourcing mode to authorization mode, while the TPR’s choice preference shifts from authorization mode to outsourcing mode. From the perspective of the whole supply chain (SC), the authorization mode would always be conducive to promoting the total profit of the SC when the OEM is capital-unconstrained. By contrast, in the case of financing portfolio, outsourcing mode would be more preferred by the SC except when remanufacturing is much profitable. The above suggests that the TPR and OEM should change their selection preferences when the OEM is severely capital-constrained. Moreover, a contract should be signed between the TPR and OEM to handle their conflicts in selection preference, and who plays an active role in coordinating the SC depends on the profitability of remanufacturing.

再制造，尤其是第三方再制造，已经成为原始设备制造商（OEM）有效平衡其运营的经济利益和环境影响的重要选择。此外，资本约束和融资行为对原始设备制造商（特别是中小型原始设备制造商）的运营具有至关重要的影响。因此，我们旨在探讨OEM的资本约束和融资行为将如何影响其在第三方再制造的两种子模式下的选择偏好：外包和授权。为此，我们考虑一个由领先的第三方再制造商（TPR）和资金受限的OEM组成的二元闭环供应链。以无资本约束的情况为基准，在资本约束和融资组合（包括贸易信贷和银行贷款）的情况下，研究了再制造模式在外包和授权之间的选择偏好。调查结果如下。与无资本约束的基准案例相比，在融资组合下，OEM的选择偏好从外包模式转变为授权模式，而TPR的选择偏好从授权模式转变为外包模式。从整个供应链（SC）的角度来看，当OEM不受资本约束时，授权模式将始终有利于提升SC的总利润。相比之下，在融资组合的情况下，SC会更倾向于采用外包模式，除非再制造可赚钱得多。以上表明，在原始设备制造商资金严重受限的情况下，TPR和OEM应更改其选择偏好。此外，TPR和OEM之间应签订合同以解决他们在选择偏好方面的冲突，而在协调SC中扮演积极角色的人则取决于再制造的获利能力。