Leibniz believed in a God that has the power to create beings and whose existence could be a priori demonstrated. Kant (KrV, A 592-602/B 620-630) objected that similar demonstrations all presuppose the false claim that existence is a real property. Russell (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) added that if existence were a real property Leibniz should have concluded that God does not actually have the power to create anything at all. First, I show that Leibniz’ conception of existence is incompatible with the one that Russell presupposes. Subsequently, I argue that on Leibniz’ conception of existence Russell’s objection is immediately undermined.

莱布尼兹（Leibniz）相信上帝具有创造生命的力量，并且其存在可以被先验地证明。康德（KrV，A 592-602 / B 620-630）反对，类似的论证都以存在存在是不动产的虚假主张为前提。罗素（伦敦和纽约：鲁特利奇，1992年）补充说，如果存在是不动产，莱布尼兹应该得出这样的结论：上帝实际上根本没有创造任何东西的能力。首先，我证明莱布尼兹的存在概念与拉塞尔所假设的存在概念是不相容的。随后，我认为关于莱布尼兹的存在概念，罗素的异议立即遭到破坏。