The study of Say-on-Pay (SOP) – a shareholder vote on executive compensation – is a key topic in the corporate governance field, despite which its influence in the context of family firms has not been studied until now. In response to this need, this paper pursues a twofold objective: first, to analyze differences in shareholder voting behavior between family and non-family firms; second, to explore the impact of increasing family ownership on voting dispersion among family firms, testing the related moderating effects of family involvement in management and governance on this relationship. Focusing on a sample of large UK listed companies from 2007–2017, our results show that the distinctive features of family firms lead to more concentrated voting positions regarding pay packages compared to non-family firms, with this voting concentration tending to be higher as family ownership increases. Moreover, while this relationship intensifies when the family is involved in management, we find partial support in the case of family involvement in governance.

Say-on-Pay (SOP) 的研究——股东对高管薪酬的投票——是公司治理领域的一个关键话题，尽管它在家族企业背景下的影响直到现在还没有被研究过。针对这一需求，本文追求双重目标：一是分析家族企业与非家族企业股东投票行为的差异；其次，探讨增加家族所有权对家族企业投票分散的影响，检验家族参与管理和治理对这种关系的相关调节作用。以 2007 年至 2017 年英国大型上市公司为样本，我们的研究结果表明，与非家族企业相比，家族企业的独特特征导致薪酬方案的投票立场更加集中，随着家庭所有权的增加，这种投票集中度往往会更高。此外，虽然当家族参与管理时这种关系会加强，但我们在家族参与治理的情况下发现部分支持。