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The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state independent
International Journal of Game Theory ( IF 0.6 ) Pub Date : 2021-04-19 , DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00774-0
Christoph Diehl , Christoph Kuzmics

Chakraborty and Harbaugh (Am Econ Rev 100(5):2361–2382, 2010) prove the existence of influential cheap talk equilibria in one sender one receiver games when the state is multidimensional and the preferences of the sender are state independent. We show that influential equilibria do not survive the introduction of any small degree of Harsanyi-uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty about the sender’s preferences in the spirit of Harsanyi (Int J Game Theory 2(1):1–23, 1973).



中文翻译:

发件人的偏好与国家无关时,有影响的廉价谈话均衡的(非)鲁棒性

Chakraborty和Harbaugh(Am Econ Rev 100(5):2361–2382,2010)证明了在一个发送者和一个接收者游戏中,当状态是多维的并且发送者的偏好与状态无关时,有影响力的廉价谈话均衡存在。我们证明,有影响力的均衡不能幸免于引入任何程度的Harsanyi不确定性,即,按照Harsanyi的精神不确定发件人的偏好(Int J博弈论2(1):1-23,1973)。

更新日期:2021-04-19
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