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From rule-taker to rule-promoting regulatory state: South Korea in the nearly-global competition regime
Regulation & Governance ( IF 3.2 ) Pub Date : 2021-04-18 , DOI: 10.1111/rego.12398
Moohyung Cho 1 , Tim Büthe 2, 3
Affiliation  

When rapid economic growth catapults a country within a few years from the margins of the global economy to middle power status, does global regulatory governance need to brace for a challenge to the status quo? To answer this question, we extend the power transition theory of global economic governance to middle powers: A rising middle power should be expected to challenge the international regulatory status quo only if increasing issue-specific strength of its regulatory state coincides with preferences that diverge from the preferences of the established powers, which are enshrined in the status quo. We examine this argument empirically, focusing on South Korea in the realm of competition law and policy. We find that South Korea, a non-participant in the international competition regime until the 1980s, developed in the 1990s substantial regulatory capacity and capability and thus “spoiler potential.” At the same time, however, its policy preferences converged upon the norms and practices established by the United States and the European Union, albeit with some distinct elements. Under these conditions, we expect a transition from rule-taker to rule-promoter. We find that South Korea has indeed in recent years begun to actively promote well-established competition law and policy norms and practices – supplemented by its distinct elements – through technical assistance programs, as well as various bilateral channels and multilateral institutions. The findings suggest that the power transition theory of global economic governance is usefully applicable to middle powers, too.

中文翻译:

从规则接受者到促进规则的监管国家:韩国在近乎全球的竞争体制中

当快速的经济增长在几年内使一个国家从全球经济边缘跃升为中等强国时,全球监管治理是否需要准备好迎接对现状的挑战?为了回答这个问题,我们将全球经济治理的权力转移理论扩展到中等强国:只有当其监管国家针对特定问题的力量不断增强,同时其偏好出现分歧时,才应该期望一个崛起的中等强国挑战国际监管现状。既定权力的偏好,这些偏好体现在现状中。我们实证检验了这一论点,重点关注竞争法和竞争政策领域的韩国。我们发现韩国直到 1980 年代都没有参与国际竞争制度,在 1990 年代发展了大量的监管能力和能力,因此是“潜在的破坏者”。然而,与此同时,它的政策偏好与美国和欧盟建立的规范和实践相一致,尽管有一些不同的元素。在这些条件下,我们期待从规则接受者到规则推动者的转变。我们发现,韩国近年来确实开始通过技术援助计划以及各种双边渠道和多边机构,积极推动完善的竞争法和政策规范和实践,并辅以其独特的要素。研究结果表明,全球经济治理的权力转移理论也适用于中等国家。然而,它的政策偏好与美国和欧盟建立的规范和实践相一致,尽管有一些不同的元素。在这些条件下,我们期待从规则接受者到规则推动者的转变。我们发现,韩国近年来确实开始通过技术援助计划以及各种双边渠道和多边机构,积极推动完善的竞争法和政策规范和实践,并辅以其独特的要素。研究结果表明,全球经济治理的权力转移理论也适用于中等国家。然而,它的政策偏好与美国和欧盟建立的规范和实践相一致,尽管有一些不同的元素。在这些条件下,我们期待从规则接受者到规则推动者的转变。我们发现,韩国近年来确实开始通过技术援助计划以及各种双边渠道和多边机构,积极推动完善的竞争法和政策规范和实践,并辅以其独特的要素。研究结果表明,全球经济治理的权力转移理论也适用于中等国家。我们期待从规则接受者到规则推动者的转变。我们发现,韩国近年来确实开始通过技术援助计划以及各种双边渠道和多边机构,积极推动完善的竞争法和政策规范和实践,并辅以其独特的要素。研究结果表明,全球经济治理的权力转移理论也适用于中等国家。我们期待从规则接受者到规则推动者的转变。我们发现,韩国近年来确实开始通过技术援助计划以及各种双边渠道和多边机构,积极推动完善的竞争法和政策规范和实践,并辅以其独特的要素。研究结果表明,全球经济治理的权力转移理论也适用于中等国家。
更新日期:2021-04-18
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