ABSTRACT

Several philosophers and psychologists have argued that evidence of moral framing effects shows that many of our moral judgments are unreliable. However, all previous empirical work on moral framing effects has used between-subject experimental designs. We argue that between-subject designs alone do not allow us to accurately estimate the extent of moral framing effects or to properly evaluate the case from framing effects against the reliability of our moral judgments. To do better, we report results of our new within-subject study on four types of moral framing effects, and we discuss the implications of our findings for the reliability of moral judgments. Overall, our results strengthen the evidence from moral framing effects against the reliability of some of our moral judgments.

摘要

几位哲学家和心理学家认为，道德框架效应的证据表明，我们的许多道德判断都是不可靠的。然而，之前所有关于道德框架效应的实证工作都使用了受试者之间的实验设计。我们认为，单独的主体间设计并不能让我们准确估计道德框架效应的程度或根据我们道德判断的可靠性从框架效应正确评估案例。为了做得更好，我们报告了我们关于四种道德框架效应的新受试者内研究的结果，并讨论了我们的发现对道德判断可靠性的影响。总的来说，我们的结果加强了道德框架效应的证据，反对我们一些道德判断的可靠性。