ABSTRACT

At face value, intentionality is a relational notion. There are, however, arguments intended to show that it is not. I categorize the strongest arguments against the relationality of intentionality into three major groups: Brentanian arguments, Fregean arguments, and Quinean arguments. I argue that, despite their prima facie plausibility, none of these arguments eventually succeeds. I then conclude that, in the absence of defeating evidence against what at face value looks correct, we are justified to consider intentionality as a relational notion.

中文翻译：

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意向性的关系

摘要

从表面上看，意向性是一个关系概念。然而，有一些论据旨在表明事实并非如此。我将反对意向性关系的最强有力的论点分为三大类：布伦坦式的论点、弗雷格式的论点和奎因式的论点。我认为，尽管这些论点表面上似乎是合理的，但这些论点最终都没有成功。然后我得出结论，在没有推翻表面价值看起来正确的证据的情况下，我们有理由将意向性视为一种关系概念。