ABSTRACT

Who should be diagnosed with intellectual disability and who should not? For borderline cases, the answer to this question may be as difficult to decide on as determining the borderline between being bald or not. While going bald may be upsetting to some, it is also an inevitable and relatively undramatic course of nature. In contrast, getting a diagnosis of intellectual disability is likely to have more far-reaching consequences. This makes the question of where the cutoff point for intellectual disability lies more imperative. Philosophy of science may help psychologists to understand the nature of this dilemma in a more profound manner.

This article builds on the sorites paradox to explore the vagueness that surrounds the concept of intellectual disability and the consequences of this vagueness for the diagnostic process. While epistemicists argue that vagueness is a consequence of our limited knowledge of the world that we live in, semantic theorists claim that there is nothing that we do not know, but that our language allows for indecisiveness. What these different lines of understanding mean for psychologists who are diagnosing intellectual disability, is described in this article. Furthermore, the article discusses practical implications of these philosophical underpinnings.

摘要

哪些人应该被诊断为智力障碍，哪些人不应该被诊断？对于边缘情况，这个问题的答案可能与确定秃头与否的界限一样难以决定。虽然秃顶可能会让一些人感到不安，但这也是一种不可避免且相对平淡无奇的自然过程。相比之下，获得智力残疾的诊断可能会产生更深远的影响。这使得智力残疾的分界点在哪里的问题变得更加迫切。科学哲学可以帮助心理学家以更深刻的方式理解这种困境的本质。

本文建立在 sorites 悖论的基础上，探讨围绕智力残疾概念的模糊性以及这种模糊性对诊断过程的影响。虽然认识论者认为模糊是我们对我们所生活的世界了解有限的结果，但语义理论家声称没有什么是我们不知道的，但我们的语言允许优柔寡断。本文描述了这些不同的理解方式对于诊断智力残疾的心理学家意味着什么。此外，本文还讨论了这些哲学基础的实际意义。