This paper investigates serial crowdfunders' performance over successive campaigns. Adopting an expected utility maximization framework in a setting with asymmetric information about hidden entrepreneurial actions and types, we propose that crowdfunding amounts raised will follow a cyclical pattern over successive campaigns. A sample drawn from the population of serial crowdfunders on Kickstarter confirms this prediction and suggests that signaling reputations via the cyclical adjustment of campaign effort may be the mechanism driving it. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.

中文翻译：

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解释连续众筹者的动态筹款表现

本文调查了连续众筹活动中连续众筹的表现。在具有关于隐藏的企业家行为和类型的非对称信息的环境中，采用期望的效用最大化框架，我们建议在后续活动中筹集的众筹金额将遵循周期性模式。从Kickstarter上的连续众筹者群体中抽取的样本证实了这一预测，并表明通过竞选活动的周期性调整来发出声誉的信号可能是推动其发展的机制。讨论了对理论和实践的影响。