Why do frequently criticized input controls survive in the management of public spending while apparently more enlightened output/outcome controls come and go? The question matters, because output/outcome controls are often assumed in public financial management and related literature to lead to superior policy performance as compared with input-focused approaches. We tackle the question by applying qualitative push–pull analysis to compare one key type of input controls (administration cost [AC] controls) with one much-discussed form of output/outcome controls (performance targets linked to spending allocations) in one major country case, the United Kingdom, over two decades. Drawing on documents and in-depth interviews with 120 key political and bureaucratic players, we conclude that bureaucratic inertia at most only partially explains the survival of input AC controls in this case. The push/pull factors associated with the politics of blame and credit made the political players fair-weather output controllers but all-weather input controllers.

中文翻译：

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谁喜欢输入控件？英国公共财务管理中的“产出而非投入”发生了什么，为什么？

为什么经常受到批评的投入控制在公共支出管理中幸存下来，而显然更开明的产出/结果控制来来去去？这个问题很重要，因为与以投入为中心的方法相比，公共财务管理和相关文献中经常假设产出/结果控制会导致更好的政策绩效。我们通过使用定性推拉分析来解决这个问题，以比较一个主要国家的一种关键类型的投入控制（管理成本 [AC] 控制）和一种备受讨论的产出/结果控制形式（与支出分配相关的绩效目标）案例，英国，超过二十年。利用文件和对 120 位主要政治和官僚机构的深入访谈，我们得出结论，在这种情况下，官僚惯性最多只能部分解释输入交流控制的生存。与指责和信用政治相关的推/拉因素使政治参与者成为公平天气的输出控制器，但全天候的输入控制器。